

NSC BRIEFING

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1 NOVEMBER 1956

**HUNGARY AND POLAND**

- I. In Hungary, Soviet troops at last withdrawing from Budapest, as Khrushchev told Bohlen they would. Now, uneasy coalition between some of multiple "revolutionary committees" and Nagy regime is trying to take over. "Revolutionaries" clearly have upper hand.
  - A. Nagy has agreed to form new army, from insurgent units, under command of "Revolutionary Armed Forces Committee."
  - B. Nagy is also forming new multi-party government, has promised future free elections and has asked withdrawal from Warsaw Pact.
  - C. New provisional government will be under compulsion to heed wishes of insurgents, who will hold military control.
- II. Moscow announced 30 Oct now prepared discuss troop withdrawals from Poland and Rumania, as well as Hungary.
  - A. Soviet troops normally stationed in Hungary probably will now return to garrisons, sit there until ordered out of country.
  - B. Units in Hungary from Rumania and USSR (at least 1 div. each) may be withdrawing to normal stations already.
- III. Internally, various Hungarian insurgent forces and "committees" represent whole spectrum political views...from "national" Communist to clearly anti-Communist."
  - A. Thus, insurgents had only two primary bases for unity; joint action in uprising and joint desire for Hungarian independence (including immediate Soviet troop withdrawal from entire country).

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**IV. In addition to basic demands--Hungarian independence and Soviet troop withdrawal--insurgents called for:**

**End of symbols of Soviet control, e.g. red star and replacement with national symbols, e.g. Kossuth coat-of-arms.**

**Liquidation Communist security and secret police.**

**Coalition government.**

**Free elections.**

- A. By 30 Oct, regime had promised to meet all these demands.**
- B. Regime has not yet committed itself specifically on certain questions of time--had dodged dates for Soviet troop withdrawal, holding free elections.**

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- V. In Poland, although Gomulka has reiterated several times that first and foremost interest is maintaining friendly alliance with USSR, new Polish Government does not feel bound to act in concert with USSR on foreign policy.
- A. CIA report states that Gomulka, mistrusting Stalinist leftovers in his foreign service, wants to arrange private contact with the US government.
- B. Domestically, Gomulka has started on measures to improve lot of average Pole, thus gaining support for regime. These include:
- i. New electoral law.
  - ii. End to unjust judicial procedures.
  - iii. End to coercive collectivization.
  - iv. Steps toward accommodation with the Church.
- VI. Moscow's 30 Oct offer negotiate withdrawal Sov troops from Satellites may be too little too late.
- A. Soviet leaders confused and unrealistic: Khrushchev is blaming Polish and Hungarian difficulties on their excessive rate of industrialization, claiming USSR had warned against this.
- B. Khrushchev told Bohlen on 29 Oct Soviets could have "crushed Poles like flies" but had shown great restraint. Conversation confirmed that Soviets seriously considered force in Poland.
- C. Molotov told Bohlen that Hungary illustrated what "small organized group" could do, that masses rarely took any initiative of their own.

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**VII. 30 Out declaration amounts almost to capitulation.**

- A. That Soviet leaders did not intend it to be capitulation is evidenced by:**
- i. great emphasis placed on Warsaw Pact as necessary to protect Communist system.**
  - ii. Pointed omission of East Germany from list of countries where continued presence of Soviet troops subject to negotiation.**
- B. However, declaration unlikely to influence course of nationalist tide among both Communists and non-Communists in Poland and Hungary.**
- C. This ugly picture puts considerable strain on Sov "collective leadership.**
- D. Khrushchev and Bulganin were subject to criticism than Molotov, who opposed Eastern European policy, or Kaganovich.**

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